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A two-centuries-old border dispute between El Salvador and Honduras was resolved in 1992. At issue in this territorial dispute was ownership of six contested pockets of land encompassing a total area of 436.9 Km2, as well as two islands (Meanguera and El Tigre) in the "Golfo de Fonseca" (GF) and right of passage for Honduras to the Pacific Ocean.
More importantly for Honduras, the ICJ ruling assured Honduras's free passage to the Pacific Ocean; also decided that the GF does not represent international waters because of the two countries' shared history as provinces of the same colonial power and subsequent membership in the United Provinces of Central America. The Court ruled, rather, that the GF is a condominium, with control being shared by El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. This paper will examine both factors concerning, the historical and current situation into the GF, as well as three alternative strategies that could be implemented by Honduras to maintain the free passage through the Pacific Ocean. In the end, I will present conclusions about the continuous dispute and some recommendations for its probable solution.
HONDURAS STRATEGIC FREE PASSAGE THROUGH THE GULF OF FONSECA
The free passage towards the Pacific Ocean through Gulf of Fonseca is an issue of strategic importance for Honduras, it is critical to both our internal and external defense, as well as to issues affecting domestic, regional and international trade.
An analysis on this free passage requires consideration not only of the historical context but an awareness of the present legal situation of the Gulf of Fonseca. Honduras and its neighbors, especially the Republic of El Salvador, maintain a constant controversy on the matter.
This essay is an approach to the present strategy of Honduras in the Pacific, detailing its objectives, forms, means and implicit risks. In addition, three alternate strategies to reach the established strategic national objectives are presented and end with the pertinent conclusions and recommendations.
History and Evolution of the Legal Situation of the Gulf of Fonseca and the Exit from Honduras to the Pacific
In order to get a clear and fast comprehension of the history and evolution of such situation, a succinct description of Honduras and its limits will be helpful.
The Name of Honduras
The Spanish used at least three different terms to refer to the area that became the Central American country of Honduras: 1
• Guaymuras -a name Columbus provided for a town near modern Trujillo.
Subsequently generalized it to apply to the whole colony.
• Higueras -a reference to the gourds that come from the Jícaro tree, many of which were found floating in the waters off the northwest coast of Honduras.
• Honduras -literally "depths" in Spanish. Cristobal Columbus is traditionally quoted as having written "Gracias a Dios que hemos salido de esas honduras" (English: "Thanks to God we have come out from those depths") while along the northeastern coast of Honduras.
In English, Honduras is sometimes referred to as Spanish Honduras to distinguish it from British Honduras, known today as Belize. The actual and official name of the country is HONDURAS and was given by Legislative Decree Nº 3, 1862 May, 7. Honduras controls a number of islands as part of its offshore territories. In the Caribbean Sea, the islands of Roatán (Isla de Roatán), Utila, and Guanaja together form Islas de la Bahía (Bay Islands), archipelago that also has a number of smaller islands. Farther out in the Caribbean are the Islas Santanillas, formerly known as Swan Islands. A number of small islands and keys can be found nearby, among them Cayos Zapotillos and Cayos Cochinos.
In the Golfo de Fonseca, the main islands under Honduran control are El Tigre, Zacate Grande (Isla Zacate Grande), and Exposición (Isla Exposición).
Maritime claims:
• contiguous zone: 24 nm (44 km)
• continental shelf: natural extension of territory or to 200 nm (370 km)
• exclusive economic zone: 200 nm (370 km)
• territorial sea: 12 nm (22 km) During this period of 108 years, 17 attempts took place to solve the controversy. The parts named different commissioners in order to negotiate international treaties; conducted conferences attempting to solve the problem, or tried to practice measures of the land that both alleged to be the owner. In spite of previous, none of the signed agreements took effect do to a lack of ratification by one or another State. In fact, far from arriving at an understanding the settlement efforts ended with Honduras and El Salvador engaged in a major armed conflict.
Honduras Political Boundaries

Attempts of Pacific Solution to Controversy 1969 -2006
In 1969, a series of incidents generated great tension between both countries; consequently a rupture the diplomatic and consular relations took place, finalizing with an armed conflict the 14 July of 1969. From that day, the dialogue between Honduras -El Salvador with regard to borders entered a new phase that would last 23 years, ending with the ruling of the ICJ on September 11, 1992.
The most relevant facts of the period 1969 -2006 were as follows:
• Thirteenth consultative meeting of the OAS
• Signature of the Act of Guatemala -1972- Most of agricultural production is destined to domestic consumption; therefore, exportable production is quite small. Raisers of cattle, porcine and hens, sell their animals to supply themselves with the agricultural products needed to produce corn and maicillo, used for their own feeding. Meat is not consumed frequently, since they prefer to sell it to El Salvador where the price is higher than in Honduras.
Vegetable production is low and those that are consumed come from other domestic regions and from El Salvador. Such a critical economic situation provokes the internal migration from the farms to the city, and the international migration of hundreds of Hondurans to the United States looking for a solution to their crisis. Other options to look at are:
• Areas with weak economic potential do not attract public and private investment. This hard fact reinforces the unequal economic development and opportunity in areas such as Southern Honduras.
• Lack of infrastructure, health and educational projects. The lack of public services such as telephone, electricity and, clean water; and the lack of roads in the border zone further isolate the South and cause them to acquire goods in El Salvador, where routes of access exist and the distances are closer.
• Donations of foods, medical brigades, different international aid and other forms of welfare assistance have been sent to the region as a palliative to the crisis, but such aid does not solve the conditions of poverty of the region.
With regards to natural resources the Gulf of Fonseca has a particular importance for the three bordering countries. The South zone of Honduras has four hydrographic river basins (Choluteca River, Nacaome River, River Goascorán and Río Negro) which drain to the Gulf of Fonseca greatly influencing greatly the natural dynamics.
Thus, the Honduran strategy can be defined in terms of objectives, forms, means and risks as follows:
Objectives
The fundamental objective is the maintenance of the status quo which allows the free passage of boats through Gulf of Fonseca towards the Pacific Ocean, communicating with the bordering countries and beyond through this important maritime route, that in the future could mean the development of an Inter-oceanic "dry canal" through national territory 9 .
Ways
Maintenance of free passage through the Gulf of Fonseca is enforced through diplomatic initiatives backed by a clearly stated national policy to this effect. Such a strategy puts the international community on notice that for Honduras the right of unimpeded passage through the Gulf is a vital national interest. Specifically it makes clear to the international community that any attempt by Nicaragua or El Salvador to block the Honduran right of free passage is unacceptable.
Means
Honduras counts upon the realization by the International Community that the loss of the right of free passage through the Gulf would be an economic calamity of enormous proportions especially for the people of Southern Honduras. Honduras also counts as a means the International Legal Court to which already it has gone in the past with good success.
Risks
Following the strategy outlined above has inherent risks. Should it fail, and the right of free passage through the Gulf is impeded or lost, the Honduran economy will take a serious blow. Executing these projects could solve the controversy, helping therefore, the economic, political and social strategies of the three countries. In addition, it would give a great impulse to both integration and regional development.
Every alternative strategy is presented as a "project profile", due to the lack of available information, thus will be necessary to conduct the corresponding feasibility studies to confirm its viability. It is not indispensable to execute the projects simultaneously nor in a short term. Every project could be executed within medium or long term.
Alternative Strategy Nº 1 Inter-Oceanic Railroad Gulf of Fonseca-Puerto Cortés
Objective
To construct and operate harbor terminals in both "Puerto Cortes" in the Atlantic and "Gulf of Fonseca" in the Pacific, capable to receive ships up to 10 meters draft; jointed by means of a high speed electrical railroad through the shortest ground route, to transfer international cargo.
Executing Entity
Company with national and/or foreign capital, granted by the State of Honduras and, an normative official organism, with participation of the National Port Enterprise, National Railroad of Honduras and Finance Secretary.
Scope of the Project
To increase harbor yearly cargo capacity in "Puerto Cortés" up to 15 million metric tons and, a new port in the Gulf of Fonseca with 10 million metric tons capacity; 405 Km. of main railroad-line and 195 Km. of branches.
Investment in US$ Millions (estimated)
• Enhancement of Puerto Cortés 600
• New port in the Gulf of Fonseca 600
• Main railroad-line and branches 1,000
• Rolling equipment and others 500 • 1,000 linear meters of pier a new port in the Gulf of Fonseca with:
o A 100,000 M2 storing zone for containers o A 30,000 M2 railway zone for loading and maneuvers o Operative and administrative facilities necessary to handle up to 10M metric tons of cargo per year.
• Main railway line of 405 Km in length between Puerto Cortés and the new port in the Gulf of Fonseca, plus a branch of 41 Km from length to the Puerto de la Unión in El Salvador and a branch from 154 km to the Puerto Corinto in Nicaragua.
Justification
• This project offers remarkable advantages over other options that could be proposed with the same purpose.
• The investment of US$ 2.700 million can be profitable considering a 50 years life utility of the facilities, in addition to the economic benefits that it would generate for the region.
Possible Obstacles
• 94 Km mountainous section to border on the dam "Francisco Morazán" could present some difficulty to the construction.
• Connection of Isla del Tigre with mainland if it were selected to construct the south harbor terminal. • The approximate lengths by country will be:
Environmental Impact
o Guatemala 500 Km.
o El Salvador 300 Km.
o Honduras 300 Km.
o Nicaragua 430 Km.
o Costa Rica 640 Km.
o Panamá 500 Km.
Total 2,670 Km.
• 1,520 km in 5 inter-oceanic highways in the 6 countries, which would serve as cross- • The greater obstacle is the lack of updated feasibility studies for a ground transport regional system, since the latest study of this type was made in 1976; another one is the lack of available loans to finance road infrastructure projects, therefore, the possibility of private investment could be considered, recovering this through a toll system.
• Displacement of the population from zones economically depressed towards zones of greater development benefited with this project.
• Probable contamination of streams from the high lands that drain in the Pacific.
• Use of 10.000 hectares of land with possible cattle and agricultural potential for the freeways.
• Deforestation of the mountainous areas in the north of El Salvador, and central zones of Honduras and Nicaragua.
Alternative Strategy Nº 3 Joint System of Patrolling, Monitoring, and Rescue in the Gulf of Fonseca Objectives • To create a system to exert joint monitoring in both, inner and the outer sides of the Gulf of -Fonseca, including the zone of mangroves.
• To provide aid in case of shipwrecks or maritime emergencies. • Four small boats for monitoring of the coast and the estuaries.
Executing Entity
• A patrol base located in a strategic place of the Gulf.
• A suitable amount of specialized patrol men.
Justification
• To carry out both efficient and economic activities within the Gulf of Fonseca, a joint security element must be established; this will be able only if the Gulf remains free of either, fiscal, migratory, sanitary, drug trafficking, problems.
Possible Obstacles
• In the region experience of this type does not exist.
Environmental Impact
• A negative environmental impact of importance is not anticipated. By the opposite, the project would contribute to avoid the damages to the ecosystems of the Gulf.
Conclusions
1. Honduras advances towards the future trusting the benefits of international justice and exerting its sovereignty on territorial waters to guarantee its security and defense, and to protect its national interests.
2. Honduras has a favorable geopolitical position and an immense wealth of marine and tourist resources that must protect and rationally take advantage of them. Article 11 of the Constitution of the Republic of Honduras states that: "also belongs to the State of Honduras the continental platform, that includes the bed and the subsoil of submarine zones that extend beyond their territorial sea and further of the natural prolongation of its territory until the outer edge of the continental margin, or until a distance of two hundred marine miles from the lines of base, from which is measured the width of the territorial sea in the cases in that the outer edge of the continental margin does not reach that distance" This article is totally supported by the International Law of the Sea, which also supports the right of sovereignty of Honduras over the Gulf of Fonseca, located in that platform; whose elements (islands, keys and waters) are natural components of the continental margin and in any case, form a single unit of the natural prolongation of the territory of Honduras 3 A.P. Sereni Thesis: Refers that the international crises distinguish three main momentous: first, an initial momentous, known as situation, in which the crisis has not even taken place, but it is in potential condition; second, conflict, that supposes a discrepancy between subjects of the International Law, which has induced or can induce to one of them to act against another one; third, Controversy or difference, when one of the parts applies opposed claims, or when one of the parts claims something that the other one do not accept. Diritto Internazionali, IV, Milano, Italy, 1965, Pages. 5 Act of Guatemala: A compilation prepared by Honduran Jurist Camilo Gomez Gomez as an argument of the Honduran defense against the claims of El Salvador. It was a document that created the Council of Indians in 1528, which ordered that it had the supreme jurisdiction of all the Western Indians of the Kingdom of Spain, delimiting the General Captaincy of Guatemala which included Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Costa Rica. The Council of Indians was a consultative organ, an Assembly, a Court, an Administrative agency, and an Academy of Studies.
